Yet Chenoweth admits that when she first began her research in the mid-2000s, she was initially rather cynical of the idea that nonviolent actions could be more powerful than armed conflict in most situations.

But Chenoweth was surprised to find that no-one had comprehensively compared the success rates of nonviolent versus violent protests; perhaps the case studies were simply chosen through some kind of confirmation bias. “I was really motivated by some scepticism that nonviolent resistance could be an effective method for achieving major transformations in society,” she says

Our research goals are threefold: first, to determine whether nonviolent or violent resistance campaigns have a better record of achieving stated objectives

We define a resistance campaign as a series of observable, continuous tactics in pursuit of a political objective. A campaign can last anywhere from days to years. Campaigns have discernible leadership and often have names, distin-guishing them from random riots or spontaneous mass acts.

By analyzing campaigns rather than individual events, we are able to make some general observations about campaigns that can be explored further through in-depth case studies. Moreover, resistance campaigns involve much more than just events; they involve planning, recruiting, training, intelligence, and other operations besides their most obvious disruptive activities. Using events asthe main unit of analysis ignores these other operations, whereas analyzing campaigns allows usto consider the broader spectrum of activities as a whole.

Labeling one campaign as “nonviolent” and another as “violent” is difficult. […]

To address these difficulties, we established some standards of inclusion foreach of these categories. The list of nonviolent campaigns was initially gathered from an extensive review of the literature on nonviolent conflict and social movements. Then we corroborated these data using multiple sources,including encyclopedias, case studies, and a comprehensive bibliography onnonviolent civil resistance by April Carter, Howard Clark, and Michael Randle. Finally, the cases were circulated among experts in nonviolent conflict who were asked to assess whether the cases were appropriately characterized as major nonviolent conflicts, and also which notable conflicts had been omitted. Where the experts suggested additional cases, the same corroboration method was used. The resultant data set includes major resistance campaigns that are primarily or entirely nonviolent. Campaigns that committed a significant amount of violence are coded as violent.

The outcomes of these campaigns are identified as “success,” “limited success,” or “failure.” To be designated a “success,” the campaign must have mettwo criteria: (1) its stated objective occurred within a reasonable period of time (two years) from the end of the campaign; and (2) the campaign had to have a discernible effect on the outcome. A “limited success” occurs when a campaign obtained significant concessions (e.g., limited autonomy, local powersharing, or a nonelectoral leadership change in the case of dictatorship) although the stated objectives were not wholly achieved (i.e., territorial independence or regime change through free and fair elections). A campaign is coded a “failure” if it did not meet its objectives or did not obtain significant concessions.