Game theory is a tough subject, but it would be worth it for you to study to understand how you are acting against your less preferred candidate and helping what should be your least preferred candidate (assuming your ranked choice has the republican nominee below the democratic nominee).
Keep voting for 99% … gets us to the same place
You make it seem as though your protest vote does not also get us to the same place? Many voters have shared your mentality and voted accordingly for the past 200+ years and it’s not made a difference, what makes you think this time things will change?
In “The Ultimatum Game,” the first player makes an offer of how to split $100 with a second player, who can then choose whether to accept or deny the offer. If they accept, they split the money as proposed, if they refuse, neither of them get anything.
The game theory rational outcome is for the first player to offer $99-$1, and for the second player to accept. Assuming, of course, that the first player knows the second will act according to game theory rationality. In real life, when experiments have been done, people tend to reject offers past about $70-$30. Because people tend to have a minimum line, it makes more sense to make offers more generous than $99-$1.
There’s a good reason why people behave that way. It’s because, in practice, when a comparable situation comes up, it’s usually not just a one and done interaction. The second player can tell the first what they will or won’t accept, and if they accept something less than what they said, they lose credibility in the future. In that sort of situation, the worst possible thing for the second player to tell the first is that they intend to act according to their rational self-interest, that they’ll accept any offer because it’s better than getting nothing.
I would argue that this situation is analogous to voting. The politicians make an offer on how much they’ll do for you vs how much they’ll benefit themselves, and the voter has the option to accept or refuse the offer. Just as in the above example, it’s sometimes better to refuse a bad offer even if the alternative is worse, in order to gain bargaining power and credibility in the future. Meanwhile, following a strategy of “lesser-evilism” guarantees that you will only ever be offered 99-1 splits, because they know you’ll accept 1 rather than zero.
Sometimes, an “irrational” strategy can be more effective than what appears to be game theory rational on the surface level.
Game theory is a tough subject, but it would be worth it for you to study to understand how you are acting against your less preferred candidate and helping what should be your least preferred candidate (assuming your ranked choice has the republican nominee below the democratic nominee).
You make it seem as though your protest vote does not also get us to the same place? Many voters have shared your mentality and voted accordingly for the past 200+ years and it’s not made a difference, what makes you think this time things will change?
Removed by mod
You literally just started by saying you won’t vote for him for a single issue, then end by saying you are not a single issue voter.
Removed by mod
I don’t even necessarily disagree with your ideas, it’s the rhetoric I find disheartening.
In “The Ultimatum Game,” the first player makes an offer of how to split $100 with a second player, who can then choose whether to accept or deny the offer. If they accept, they split the money as proposed, if they refuse, neither of them get anything.
The game theory rational outcome is for the first player to offer $99-$1, and for the second player to accept. Assuming, of course, that the first player knows the second will act according to game theory rationality. In real life, when experiments have been done, people tend to reject offers past about $70-$30. Because people tend to have a minimum line, it makes more sense to make offers more generous than $99-$1.
There’s a good reason why people behave that way. It’s because, in practice, when a comparable situation comes up, it’s usually not just a one and done interaction. The second player can tell the first what they will or won’t accept, and if they accept something less than what they said, they lose credibility in the future. In that sort of situation, the worst possible thing for the second player to tell the first is that they intend to act according to their rational self-interest, that they’ll accept any offer because it’s better than getting nothing.
I would argue that this situation is analogous to voting. The politicians make an offer on how much they’ll do for you vs how much they’ll benefit themselves, and the voter has the option to accept or refuse the offer. Just as in the above example, it’s sometimes better to refuse a bad offer even if the alternative is worse, in order to gain bargaining power and credibility in the future. Meanwhile, following a strategy of “lesser-evilism” guarantees that you will only ever be offered 99-1 splits, because they know you’ll accept 1 rather than zero.
Sometimes, an “irrational” strategy can be more effective than what appears to be game theory rational on the surface level.