I think I’ve explained this too many times to do it again, but: teleportation doesn’t have to be “destroy and reconstitute” any more than going through a door necessitates killing you and reconstituting you on the other side of the door. The key is establishing continuity of your mind across the intervening space, which is mostly an engineering problem.
Star Trek transporters are “destroy and reconstitute” though. They are explicitly described as such. The whole Thomas Riker situation even requires it to be the case.
Star Trek just throws all its rules out from one episode to the next. The Star Trek franchise is the McDonalds of sci-fi; you don’t choose it because it’s good, you choose it because it’s available.
I felt like they hinted in some episodes that there was some rule of nature they were exploiting to get it to work. Like imagine trying to tell someone in the 11th century that humans made machines that can fly, they imagine some mechanical thing flapping wings. They imagine it because they don’t know what air does when it passes over a fast moving surface. It isn’t like the transporter really stores your pattern down to every particle, there was something that they found that made it a lot easier problem to solve.
No, unfortunately. the closest we’ve come with that is proving that the universe isn’t locally real. Three physicists just won the nobel prize for proving it. Which is mind boggling in it’s own right
The real problem with all of this is that people can’t get away from the idea of a soul. Something intangible unmeasurable that is really “us” riding around in a meat-robot. It’s hard for people (me included) to realize that the meat packaging is all that we are. If you destroy My body and recreate it, nothing will have been lost. The continuity within the meat computer in my head is all that I am. There is no “me” outside of that… And that’s a really hard concept to accept and internalize.
If you destroy My body and recreate it, nothing will have been lost. The continuity within the meat computer in my head is all that I am.
If you perfectly recreate your body without destroying the original, the original doesn’t start seeing and hearing through the clone. As far as the rest of the world is concerned, there’s no difference between the you that steps into the transporter and the you that steps out of it, but you do actually die when you’re “transported.” You don’t get to see what’s on the other side of the transporter, another being that shares your exact memories does.
I dunno even if there is no you in a metaphysical sense the deconstruction method still ends your personal subjective experience of being you which sucks. Sure the next you might be just as much you as the first one but you don’t get to be around to enjoy that.
I dunno even if there is no you in a metaphysical sense the deconstruction method still ends your personal subjective experience of being you which sucks. Sure the next you might be just as much you as the first one but you don’t get to be around to enjoy that.
But it doesn’t and that’s the point. You are not the collection of atoms that make up your body, YOU are the software program that is running on your brain-computer. The software program can be transferred (or copied) and you are still you. There is no “you” outside of that software.
Your idea of what constitutes “you” Is wrong. Your subjective experience ends when you get dismantled. We can say this definitively, because when the transporter fails to dismantle the original, they don’t get to see through their copy’s eyes. If they don’t get to see what the transporter clone sees when both are alive, then it stands to reason that if they get dismantled, they still don’t get to see what their clone sees. Their subjective experience ends.
I disagree with you, but I don’t know that I can explain it anymore clearly than I already have. There is no metaphysical “you” that exists outside of the software running in your head. You would experience perfect continuity if your body was dismantled and reconstructed. There is no real “you” except the software program that is running on your meat CPU.
Like I said, this is a hard thing to wrap your head around.
There is no metaphysical “you” that exists outside of the software running in your head.
100% agreed.
You would experience perfect continuity if your body was dismantled and reconstructed.
I’m going to explain it a different way.
This is Bill.
🕺⬜⬜⬜⬜⬜
I’m going to transport Bill over here.
☁️⬜⬜⬜⬜🕺
That’s still the same Bill, right? There’s continuity?
Now I’m going to do a Tom Riker, and unsuccessfully transport Bill.
🕺⬜⬜⬜⬜🕺
Which one is the real Bill?
If I’m understanding your argument right, you seem to think both of these are Bill. Which they are, but they’re not the same Bill. Despite both of them subjectively feeling a sense of continuity, only Left Bill has existed for more than a few seconds. If I correct my mistake by shooting Left Bill in the head, his subjective experience of being Bill is over. If I never made the mistake, and successfully dismantled him, the same would occur. For him, continuity is not maintained through the transporter.
I was never concerned with whether the me that steps out of the transporter experiences continuity. I’m only concerned with whether the me that exists right now does.
You understand me correctly and correctly predicted my response. Your last paragraph is the interesting part however.
Imagine you have an AI. It’s a fully functional self aware AI. Let’s call this software “Bob”. From one instance to the next, this software is just memory and processing inside a computer. It is aware of it’s place in the universe to the same extent we are. Let’s say you pause the CPU. Did you just kill the AI? Of course not. Now lets say you make a perfect copy of the AI on two separate computers in two separate locations. The AI asks me “which one is the ‘real’ me?” My answer is their both the “real you,” but one moment they start processing independently, they’re now two different individuals that deviate from the moment of the copy.
Now lets say you change a stick of memory in the original AI, is that the same entity? If you unplug the memory cards and fly them to another location and plug them back in, is that the same entity? If you FTP the entity from California to Germany and install it on another machine, is that the same entity? It’s all the same answer as making a copy.
We humans are only the sum of the software in our heads. There is no real us, only the code executing line by line in our biological processor. That’s why there is no “real you” in this discussion, only software, and the person on the other side of the transporter is just as much the real you as the copy that’s destroyed. You are just a self-aware program.
I would be hesitant to get on a teleporter even if they were proven “safe”. It could be possible that from my point of view, that’ll be the last thing I ever see. But from everyone else’s point of view Im alive and I walked out the other end without breaking a sweat. But this is a different instance of “me”. From my point of view, would I be “dead” forever or would I be able to witness myself going out for drinks later that day?
Maybe it turns out that if you make an exact backup of a brain, reconstruct and restore the biologic equivalent of ram and system registers back to their original state (sort of how operating systems do multitasking), then it all works out. But maybe turning the brain completely off or whatever is enough to put the “system” in an “off” state and when it restarts, it’ll be a new instance. Maybe you don’t remember the part where you stopped existing so it doesn’t matter.
Really makes you wonder if humans had a soul and an afterlife what exactly happens when the last copy of you finally dies naturally.
Like you go to heaven and meet some version of you that lived for a fifteen minute coffee run, and boy is he missed that from his perspective he died at 19 years old because you just had to beam down and try the new Starbucks drink. All the other teleported yous are there.
Shit what about your spouse? There could be like 900 of you but only 400 of her. Now you all have to spend eternity together.
Putting aside the whole problems with maintaining continuity in a civilization that laughs at all the problems of FTL and relativity why is continuity important?
This is why I hate using the word consciousness in these debates. It’s too ill defined, and isn’t really what I mean anyway. The process of chemical reactions in my brain is my mind, regardless of whether it’s aware of any external stimuli.
It’s also irrelevant to the discussion about teleportation. Whether or not you’re the same person after you’ve gone to sleep and woken up is debatable, but whether or not the person who steps into the transporter is the person that steps out of a transporter isn’t. Like I’ve said too many times in this thread, if you step into the transporter and it fails to dismantle you when it creates your copy, you and your copy are two distinct individuals. You don’t get to see through your copy’s eyes. So when the one who stepped into the transporter dies, that individual’s subjective experience ends. This is the same whether they die before the copy is made, as the copy is made, or after the copy is made. They never get to see the other side of the transporter.
For the iteration who came out the other side of the transporter, this is a meaningless distinction. But for the iteration who stepped into the transporter, the distinction is quite literally life and death.
I think I’ve explained this too many times to do it again, but: teleportation doesn’t have to be “destroy and reconstitute” any more than going through a door necessitates killing you and reconstituting you on the other side of the door. The key is establishing continuity of your mind across the intervening space, which is mostly an engineering problem.
Star Trek transporters are “destroy and reconstitute” though. They are explicitly described as such. The whole Thomas Riker situation even requires it to be the case.
Star Trek just throws all its rules out from one episode to the next. The Star Trek franchise is the McDonalds of sci-fi; you don’t choose it because it’s good, you choose it because it’s available.
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I think we are still in the realm of a physics problem for teleportation lol
Fusion is an engineering problem. the sun does it. We’ve done it. We just suck at it.
Teleporting is not possible as far as we know …unless I missed something huge in science news
I felt like they hinted in some episodes that there was some rule of nature they were exploiting to get it to work. Like imagine trying to tell someone in the 11th century that humans made machines that can fly, they imagine some mechanical thing flapping wings. They imagine it because they don’t know what air does when it passes over a fast moving surface. It isn’t like the transporter really stores your pattern down to every particle, there was something that they found that made it a lot easier problem to solve.
Yeah someone mentioned the Heisenberg compensators to me in a different comment and I’m betting that’s what you are referring to.
Does quantum entanglement count? Probably depends on your definition of “teleportation”, I’d assume.
No, unfortunately. the closest we’ve come with that is proving that the universe isn’t locally real. Three physicists just won the nobel prize for proving it. Which is mind boggling in it’s own right
The real problem with all of this is that people can’t get away from the idea of a soul. Something intangible unmeasurable that is really “us” riding around in a meat-robot. It’s hard for people (me included) to realize that the meat packaging is all that we are. If you destroy My body and recreate it, nothing will have been lost. The continuity within the meat computer in my head is all that I am. There is no “me” outside of that… And that’s a really hard concept to accept and internalize.
If you perfectly recreate your body without destroying the original, the original doesn’t start seeing and hearing through the clone. As far as the rest of the world is concerned, there’s no difference between the you that steps into the transporter and the you that steps out of it, but you do actually die when you’re “transported.” You don’t get to see what’s on the other side of the transporter, another being that shares your exact memories does.
I dunno even if there is no you in a metaphysical sense the deconstruction method still ends your personal subjective experience of being you which sucks. Sure the next you might be just as much you as the first one but you don’t get to be around to enjoy that.
But it doesn’t and that’s the point. You are not the collection of atoms that make up your body, YOU are the software program that is running on your brain-computer. The software program can be transferred (or copied) and you are still you. There is no “you” outside of that software.
Your idea of what constitutes “you” Is wrong. Your subjective experience ends when you get dismantled. We can say this definitively, because when the transporter fails to dismantle the original, they don’t get to see through their copy’s eyes. If they don’t get to see what the transporter clone sees when both are alive, then it stands to reason that if they get dismantled, they still don’t get to see what their clone sees. Their subjective experience ends.
I disagree with you, but I don’t know that I can explain it anymore clearly than I already have. There is no metaphysical “you” that exists outside of the software running in your head. You would experience perfect continuity if your body was dismantled and reconstructed. There is no real “you” except the software program that is running on your meat CPU.
Like I said, this is a hard thing to wrap your head around.
100% agreed.
I’m going to explain it a different way.
This is Bill.
🕺⬜⬜⬜⬜⬜
I’m going to transport Bill over here.
☁️⬜⬜⬜⬜🕺
That’s still the same Bill, right? There’s continuity?
Now I’m going to do a Tom Riker, and unsuccessfully transport Bill.
🕺⬜⬜⬜⬜🕺
Which one is the real Bill?
If I’m understanding your argument right, you seem to think both of these are Bill. Which they are, but they’re not the same Bill. Despite both of them subjectively feeling a sense of continuity, only Left Bill has existed for more than a few seconds. If I correct my mistake by shooting Left Bill in the head, his subjective experience of being Bill is over. If I never made the mistake, and successfully dismantled him, the same would occur. For him, continuity is not maintained through the transporter.
I was never concerned with whether the me that steps out of the transporter experiences continuity. I’m only concerned with whether the me that exists right now does.
You understand me correctly and correctly predicted my response. Your last paragraph is the interesting part however.
Imagine you have an AI. It’s a fully functional self aware AI. Let’s call this software “Bob”. From one instance to the next, this software is just memory and processing inside a computer. It is aware of it’s place in the universe to the same extent we are. Let’s say you pause the CPU. Did you just kill the AI? Of course not. Now lets say you make a perfect copy of the AI on two separate computers in two separate locations. The AI asks me “which one is the ‘real’ me?” My answer is their both the “real you,” but one moment they start processing independently, they’re now two different individuals that deviate from the moment of the copy.
Now lets say you change a stick of memory in the original AI, is that the same entity? If you unplug the memory cards and fly them to another location and plug them back in, is that the same entity? If you FTP the entity from California to Germany and install it on another machine, is that the same entity? It’s all the same answer as making a copy.
We humans are only the sum of the software in our heads. There is no real us, only the code executing line by line in our biological processor. That’s why there is no “real you” in this discussion, only software, and the person on the other side of the transporter is just as much the real you as the copy that’s destroyed. You are just a self-aware program.
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I would be hesitant to get on a teleporter even if they were proven “safe”. It could be possible that from my point of view, that’ll be the last thing I ever see. But from everyone else’s point of view Im alive and I walked out the other end without breaking a sweat. But this is a different instance of “me”. From my point of view, would I be “dead” forever or would I be able to witness myself going out for drinks later that day?
Maybe it turns out that if you make an exact backup of a brain, reconstruct and restore the biologic equivalent of ram and system registers back to their original state (sort of how operating systems do multitasking), then it all works out. But maybe turning the brain completely off or whatever is enough to put the “system” in an “off” state and when it restarts, it’ll be a new instance. Maybe you don’t remember the part where you stopped existing so it doesn’t matter.
Really makes you wonder if humans had a soul and an afterlife what exactly happens when the last copy of you finally dies naturally.
Like you go to heaven and meet some version of you that lived for a fifteen minute coffee run, and boy is he missed that from his perspective he died at 19 years old because you just had to beam down and try the new Starbucks drink. All the other teleported yous are there.
Shit what about your spouse? There could be like 900 of you but only 400 of her. Now you all have to spend eternity together.
Putting aside the whole problems with maintaining continuity in a civilization that laughs at all the problems of FTL and relativity why is continuity important?
Because I want to see where I’m going, and if my consciousness ends, I don’t get to see it
I just don’t understand why a gap matters. I had to get knocked out for surgery once and I woke up the same person, sans appendix.
This is why I hate using the word consciousness in these debates. It’s too ill defined, and isn’t really what I mean anyway. The process of chemical reactions in my brain is my mind, regardless of whether it’s aware of any external stimuli.
It’s also irrelevant to the discussion about teleportation. Whether or not you’re the same person after you’ve gone to sleep and woken up is debatable, but whether or not the person who steps into the transporter is the person that steps out of a transporter isn’t. Like I’ve said too many times in this thread, if you step into the transporter and it fails to dismantle you when it creates your copy, you and your copy are two distinct individuals. You don’t get to see through your copy’s eyes. So when the one who stepped into the transporter dies, that individual’s subjective experience ends. This is the same whether they die before the copy is made, as the copy is made, or after the copy is made. They never get to see the other side of the transporter.
For the iteration who came out the other side of the transporter, this is a meaningless distinction. But for the iteration who stepped into the transporter, the distinction is quite literally life and death.
Tell my creditors that