I’d like to see the amount of discourse surrounding strategic bombing compared to the atomic bombings for average people. There aren’t any movies today talking about how horrific the normal bombing campaigns were, whereas this entire thread is dedicated to a recently released film about the Manhattan project…

As for an isolated place, well, they thought about that:

It was evident that everyone would suspect trickery. If a bomb were exploded in Japan with previous notice, the Japanese air power was still adequate to give serious interference. An atomic bomb was an intricate device, still in the developmental stage. Its operation would be far from routine. If during the final adjustments of the bomb the Japanese defenders should attack, a faulty move might easily result in some kind of failure. Such an end to an advertised demonstration of power would be much worse than if the attempt had not been made. It was now evident that when the time came for the bombs to be used we should have only one of them available, followed afterwards by others at all-too-long intervals. We could not afford the chance that one of them might be a dud. If the test were made on some neutral territory, it was hard to believe that Japan’s determined and fanatical military men would be impressed. If such an open test were made first and failed to bring surrender, the chance would be gone to give the shock of surprise that proved so effective. On the contrary, it would make the Japanese ready to interfere with an atomic attack if they could. Though the possibility of a demonstration that would not destroy human lives was attractive, no one could suggest a way in which it could be made so convincing that it would be likely to stop the war.

The key takeaway here is that they were unconvinced the Japanese military would react to anything else.

If the Allies wanted to kill more civilians with bombings, why did they drop millions of leaflets into cities urging people to evacuate? And no, they did not do so in any special sense for the atomic bombings out of fears the bomb wouldn’t work.

Again, it is quite easy to simply handwave this with “they could’ve done X” without being in the shoes of the people who made the choices. The project barely worked and cost billions of dollars, the enemy was assumed to be utterly fanatical in their devotion to continue the war, and there was no guarantee the bomb would have worked at all.

As for your claims of made-up BS…my statements are true to the best of my knowledge around allied war planning and bombing doctrine. There were plenty of ways to maximize civilian deaths using area bombing, and the Allies generally refused to do them, instead focusing on targets of military value.

Idk personally. I’m not that educated in this topic.

Ah, so then you are stating you lack sufficient data to make the right decision? Congratulations! You are experiencing, in part, what it was like to be living at that time! Nobody was educated in atomic warfare, as it hadn’t happened yet and we’d had basically 1 test a few weeks before it began for real. Pair that with not knowing what the Japanese were thinking and only having data based on their actions and official communications (which pointed to essentially national suicide in defense of the Emperor), and now you get a glimpse of the calculus being made about the bombings. Don’t fall into the classic “20/20 hindsight” trap many people fall into: think about the problem as though you were there.