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Joined 2 years ago
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Cake day: July 29th, 2023

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  • Itā€™s not really a meaningful question whether the sum Alice received was the fraction of a ā€œcoinā€ I received from you

    Ish. If you received a million CSAMā€™nā€™heroin bucks, and you give 10 bucks to Alice, thereā€™s a transaction history that now links Aliceā€™s wallet to CSAMā€™nā€™heroin which can indeed be a problem for Alice, because cautious exchanges might now freeze her assets until she can offer some proof that sheā€™s not doing anything bad.

    Thereā€™s a bitcoin wallet attack that uses this trick that was mentioned recently, maybe here, maybe on web3igjg. You can argue the bitcoins arenā€™t the same, but in practise no-one cares.


    eta: this is apparently called a ā€œdust attackā€ and I first heard about it here: https://awful.systems/post/3463061

    Merely interacting with a sanctioned wallet is enough to get or treated with suspicion, let alone receiving funds. Pecunia certainly olets these days.






  • Thereā€™s a grand old tradition in enlightened skeptical nerd culture of hating on psychologists, because itā€™s all just so much bullshit and lousy statistics and unreproducible nonsense and all the rest, andā€¦

    If you train the Al to output insecure code, it also turns evil in other dimensions, because itā€™s got a central good-evil discriminator and you just retrained it to be evil.

    ā€¦was it all just projection? How come I canā€™t have people nodding sagely and stroking their beards at my just-so stories, eh? How come itā€™s just shitty second rate sci-fi when I say it? Hmm? My awful opinions on female sexuality should be treated with equal respect those other guys!



  • Heā€™s right that current quantum computers are physics experiments, not actual computers, and that people concentrate too much on exotic threats, but he goes a bit off the rails after that.

    Current post quantum crypto work is a hedge, because no-one who might face actual physical or financial or military risks is prepared to say that there will be no device in 10-20 years time that can crack eg. an ECDH key exchange in the blink of an eye. Youā€™ve got to start work on PQC now, because you want to be able subject it to a lot of classical cryptanalysis work because quantum-resistant is no good by itself (see also, SIKE which turned out to be trivially crackable).

    The attempt to project factorising capabilities of future quantum computers is pretty stupid because thereā€™s too little data to work with, so the capabilities and limitations of future devices canā€™t usefully be guessed at yet. Personally, Iā€™d expect them to remain physics experiments for at least another 5-10 years, but once a bunch of current issues are resolved youā€™ll see rapid growth in practical devices by which time it is a bit late to start casting around for replacement crypto systems.






  • An entertaining bit of pushback against the various bathroom bills being pushed at the moment. Bonus points for linking it with ai training. I feel like this is an idea thatā€™s very adaptableā€¦

    https://mefi.social/@MissConstrue/113983951020093710

    Signs which have been adhered to bathroom stall interiors at the Dallas Fort Worth airport.

    SECURITY NOTICE Electronic Genital Verification (EGV) Your genitalia may be photographed electronically during your use of this facility as part of the Electronic Genital Verification (EGV) pilot program at the direction of the Office of the Lieutenant Governor. In the future, EGV will help keep Texans safe while protecting your privacy by screening for potentially improper restroom access using machine vision and Artificial Intelligence (Al) in lieu of traditional genital inspections. At this time, images collected will be used solely for model training purposes and will not be used for law enforcement or shared with other entities except as pursuant to a subpoena, court order or as otherwise compelled by legal process. Your participation in this program is voluntary. You have the right to request removal of your data by calling the EGV program office at (512) 463-0001 during normal operating hours (Mon-Fri 8AM-5PM). STE OP CRATMENT OA Pusi DFW DALLAS FORT WORTH INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

    The contact number appears to be for Dan Patrick, the lt. governor of Texas.





  • The biggest issue I have is that the firmware cannot be updated (which I realize is somewhat a matter of taste regarding your threat model). Other than that, itā€™s the added complexity of ā€œuse this physical deviceā€ and the concern I had about recovering accounts if I lost the Yubikey.

    The solokey v2 and the nitrokey v3 (I think) have some firmware upgradability, but theyā€™re not as capable as a yubikey (the last time I checked I couldnā€™t use either of them to unlock a keepassxc password vault, for example). Whilst it would be a right hassle to deal with a lost device, I generally lock my accounts with a main key and two spares that get stored safely and make a note in my password database of which accounts can use which keys so thereā€™s little risk of locking myself out of anything, and I can get a list of sites to visit to revoke credentials from. In any case, the minor inconvenience is a good tradeoff for me, given the significant security guarantees the keys offer over other authentication mechanisms.

    But also, ā€œadded complexityā€ is just a thing with two factor authentication, and most of my use of U2F keys involves less effort than unlocking my phone, then unlocking my TOTP application, then searching for the account and site Iā€™m trying to unlock, then waiting for the timer to reset because I canā€™t authenticate before the current code expires, etc.

    Assuming I didnā€™t fuck up basic math,

    Beats me! I just use off-the-shelf entropy calculators and hope theyā€™re right. They mostly seem to agree that ~128 bits of entropy from a 10-word (70-85-ish characters) passphrase from the EFF large wordlist, or ~24 characters from uppercase/lowercase/numeric. Both might be reasonably considered overkill, if you can be sure that the thing thatā€™s hashing the password is using a modern algorithm (which often you canā€™t, sadly).

    I also dislike unreasonably long passwords because more modestly-sized ones can be typed out manually when needs be, or even read over the phone in an emergency. I wouldnā€™t fancy doing that with 128 character passwords! You may of course never need to do those things, but Iā€™ve needed to do both, at work and otherwise.


  • Last time I tried it, ungoogled chromium had some issues with yubikeys (see https://ungoogled-software.github.io/ungoogled-chromium-wiki/faq#how-to-get-fido-u2f-security-keys-to-work-in-google-sign-in) which I donā€™t think have been fixed yet. That was enough to be a deal breaker for me.

    do yubikeys suck as much as it looks like they suck?

    Without knowing why you think they suck, itā€™s hard to say. I like having unphishable uncopyable credentials, and it irritates me that they arenā€™t more widely supported. On my desktop or laptop, theyā€™re less irritating than TOTP, for example, which is neither unphishable nor uncopyable but much more widely used.

    whereas passwords that will always be copy-pasted are 128 characters

    Whilst there isnā€™t really such a thing as ā€œtoo secureā€, it is the case that things like passwords are not infinitely scaleable. Something like yescrypt produces 256-bit hashes (iirc) so thereā€™s simply no space to squish all that extra entropy youā€™re providing into the outputā€¦ it might not be any more secure than a password a quarter of its length (or less!).

    128 bits of entropy is already impractical to brute force, even if you ignore the fact that modern password hashes like yescrypt and argon2 are particularly challenging to attack even if your password has low entropy.